India
Source: www.thehindu.com

Engagements indicate New Delhi is stepping up its global outreach amidst the war in West Asia and talks of economic austerity measures at home triggered by an energy crisis

This is Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi first visit to India in a year. File | Photo Credit: AP
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi will travel to New Delhi this week to attend the BRICS Foreign Ministers meeting on May 14 to 15 and is expected to call on Prime Minister Narendra Modi before the latter’s visit to the UAE, diplomatic sources confirmed to The Hindu.

Mr. Araghchi, who will arrive on Wednesday (May 13, 2026), is expected to meet the Prime Minister in a joint call-on along with other BRICS Ministers from Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia on Thursday (May 14, 2026).

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is likely to be in Beijing for the visit of U.S. President Donald Trump set for the same dates. Officials did not confirm whether UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan will travel to Delhi for the BRICS meet or remain in Abu Dhabi to receive Mr. Modi. The flurry of diplomatic meetings at the highest levels indicates India is stepping up its outreach amidst the war in West Asia, which has had a deep economic impact on the country and the region.

Mr. Modi’s visit to the UAE will come at the start of his six-day five-nation tour to Europe from May 15 to 20. He is expected to visit Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, and Norway for bilateral visits. In Oslo, he will attend the Nordic-India Summit including leaders of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, and Norway.

“This visit underlines the importance of cooperation with India, Norway and the Nordic countries in these times of global instability. We stand together in promoting international cooperation and a rules-based world order,” Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre said announcing Mr. Modi’s visit, indicating that the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, Iran, and Gaza are expected to be discussed during the summit.

The engagements in Delhi and Abu Dhabi will be particularly significant as they come amidst a pause in the war in West Asia, and just as the government begins to implement austerity measures on oil and foreign exchange and travel, proposed by Mr. Modi at a public meeting in Hyderabad on Sunday (May 10, 2026).

Mr. Modi’s meeting with Mr. Araghchi, just ahead of his talks with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed, comes a week after tensions between Iran and the UAE escalated when Iran attacked the Fujairah oil facility with missiles. India condemned the strikes, while Iran indicated that it was targeting the UAE for its support to the U.S. after American warships attacked Iranian naval boats in the Strait of Hormuz.

This is Mr. Araghchi’s first visit to India in a year. In March, a few days after the U.S.-Israel strikes on Iran began, his deputy Saeed Khatibzadeh had visited Delhi and met External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar. Mr. Araghchi and Mr. Jaishankar have spoken over the telephone five times since the conflict began. Of particular concern for India is the continued blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, with 13 Indian ships and 340 seafarers stuck inside the Strait, and energy, fertilizer and other shipments also held up.

Meanwhile, in Delhi, ahead of the BRICS conference, representatives of all BRICS countries, or ‘Sherpas’, gathered on Monday (May 11, 2026) to discuss the agenda for the grouping of emerging economies.

The BRICS meeting on Thursday (May 14, 2026) and Friday (May 15, 2026), hosted by Mr. Jaishankar, will set the agenda for the summit on September 10 to 11. Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Iran President Masoud Pezeshkian, UAE President Mohammad Bin Zayed, Egyptian President Abdel Fatah El-Sisi, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto will be invited to Delhi. Brazilian President Lula, who faces elections in October, will probably not attend and had conveyed his difficulties during his visit to Delhi for the Artificial Intelligence Summit in February this year.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

Authors: Eugene F. Arokiasamy and Nao Margaret Samuel

Senator Jaziri Alkaf Abdillah Suffian, Chairman of the International Bureau of Bersatu Malaysia, is emerging as one of the most consequential voices shaping Malaysia’s future foreign engagement. With a leadership style rooted in inclusion, multilateral partnerships, and cultural connectivity, Senator Jaziri represents a new generation of Malaysian diplomacy. His work across ASEAN+3, BRICS, the EU, and G7 stakeholders reflects a carefully calibrated vision: cooperation over competition, innovation linked to cultural depth, and people-to-people diplomacy as a strategic asset.

Inclusive Global Engagement: ASEAN+3, BRICS, EU and G7

Senator Jaziri has cultivated strategic partnerships across geopolitical groupings with ease and purpose:

In ASEAN+3 dialogues, he has focused on regional integration, education, and technology transfer.
Through BRICS-linked platforms, he has reinforced South–South cooperation that foregrounds equity and sustainability.

With EU and G7 interlocutors, he has positioned Malaysia as a constructive interlocutor on digitalisation, global governance, and climate cooperation.

What distinguishes his engagements is not just participation, but design. Under his watch, Bersatu Malaysia’s international outreach is evolving into a Malaysian model of multilateralism, one that welcomes perse blocs into coordinated developmental frameworks. Throughout his recent engagements, from diplomatic dialogues to ASEAN or EU or BRICS gatherings, Senator has emphasised the importance of cooperation over competition and partnerships that leave no nation behind. Throughout his recent global engagements, from educational and SDG initiatives in Sarawak to diplomatic interactions with partners in Asia, Europe, Africa, Oceania and the Americas, he has demonstrated a consistent emphasis on cooperation, people-centric diplomacy and shared prosperity.

Inclusive Global Engagement: ASEAN+3, BRICS, EU and G7

In recent years, Senator Jaziri has engaged with perse networks and strategic partners around the world:

• Within ASEAN+3, he has emphasised regional integration and collaboration on technology, education and sustainable development.
• Through BRICS-related forums and dialogues, he has advocated for South–South cooperation that balances economic growth with social equity.
• Engagements with European partners and G7 stakeholders have reinforced the importance of global governance frameworks that support innovation and shared prosperity.

Cultural Diplomacy Soft Power in Action

Senator Jaziri Alkaf’s work reflects a nuanced understanding that no nation can address tomorrow’s challenges in isolation, whether in climate resilience, digital transformation or economic inclusion. He continues to lead with vigour and global vision in fostering international cooperation, people‑to‑people diplomacy, and strategic collaborations across continents and cultures. Thus, in recent months, Senator Jaziri has been deeply engaged in dialogues and activities that reflect Malaysia’s growing role in inclusive diplomacy, working not just within traditional alliances, but embracing multilateral engagement and cultural partnership on the world stage.

One of the clearest manifestations of Senator Jaziri’s quiet diplomacy is the restoration of the historic Russian wooden sailing vessel, The Pilgrim, in Sarawak. The vessel, which had sailed over 23,000 nautical miles, was repaired and revived through the collaborative work of Russian partners, local Malaysian boatbuilders, community leaders, and Sarawak-based logistics actors.

“This is cultural diplomacy at its purest,” Senator Jaziri stated. “It didn’t begin with treaties or multilateral declarations. It began with trust, skills, and mutual respect.”

He has since proposed a Malaysian-built replica of The Pilgrim, the historic Russian wooden sailing vessel, to serve as a roaming museum of maritime heritage and cross-cultural friendship. This symbolic gesture, backed by grassroots participation, embodies Malaysia’s ability to host collaborative international projects at scale. In conversations with local leaders and communities, Senator Jaziri highlighted how the vessel’s restoration is more than a technical feat. It is a living symbol of cultural diplomacy and human cooperation that transcends formal treaty rooms.

“Cultural diplomacy does not always begin with treaties or speeches, but with genuine encounters,” he reflected, noting the shared commitment that brought the Pilgrim back to sea and into a renewed voyage of friendship. Originally built in Russia and having travelled more than 23 000 nautical miles, the ship’s successful repair and resumption of its voyage underscored the power of genuine human cooperation, beyond formal treaties or speeches. The vessel’s journey across continents and welcome in Sarawak showcased how cultural exchange and shared heritage can build bridges between nations.”

Senator Jaziri added, “This is cultural diplomacy at its purest,” reflecting on the cooperation between local boatbuilders, community stakeholders and international partners that brought the Pilgrim back to sea. He also proposed the idea of a Malaysian‑built replica of the vessel, a roaming museum of friendship and maritime heritage that could enrich cultural tourism and further solidify ties between Malaysia and its global partners.

If Senator Jaziri could orchestrate a Russian ship restoration in Sarawak, he can do it with any friendly nation, Australia, USA, China, or from the EU. The implication is clear: Jaziri doesn’t just talk multilateralism; he delivers it in the form of ships, shared history, and shared outcomes.

Historical Leadership in SDG Education and International Recognition

Senator Jaziri’s work extends beyond cultural exchanges. As a key figure in Malaysia’s international engagement efforts, he has represented the country at meetings with partners across the BRICS nations and beyond, promoting peace, mutual understanding and sustainable development cooperation. His leadership vision emphasises that trust and mutual respect are built not only through official dialogues, but through shared experiences, cultural exchanges and human connection.
Long before his current appointment, Senator Jaziri played a pivotal role in advancing Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) education in Malaysia. In Sarawak, under the umbrella of the MyProdigy programme, he championed the rollout of an SDG-aligned curriculum designed to develop design thinking, critical thinking, growth mindset and resilience among young learners: from secondary schools to universities. The programme, delivered through collaboration with Japan’s Active Learning Association (JALA) and supported by educational leaders, was recognised by Professor Jeffrey D. Sachs, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General on the SDGs, underscoring Malaysia’s potential role in SDG localisation and youth empowerment.

“These skills are essential for equipping students with the competencies needed for the 21st century,” Senator Jaziri said at the time, emphasising the importance of global perspectives, sustainability and self-driven learning.

This early engagement reflected his belief that sustainable development begins with human capacity-building, long before traditional policy platforms take shape. It also shows Senator Jaziri as a leader who aligns national priorities with global goals, not rhetorically, but through implementation.

A Vision for Shared Prosperity

As Chairman of the International Bureau of Bersatu Malaysia, President of BRIC International Malaysia and Executive Chairman of MyProdigy Foundation of Malaysia, Senator Jaziri continues to articulate a foreign policy vision. As Malaysia repositions itself within a multipolar world, Senator Jaziri’s diplomatic style offers a glimpse of what modern engagement can look like:

- Connects cultural heritage with future-ready innovation
- Bridges ASEAN ambition with global strategic partnerships
- Centers people, sustainability and empowerment

This broad and inclusive approach positions Malaysia as a constructive partner on the world stage, capable of convening perse stakeholders in pursuit of sustainable and shared development. Under Senator Jaziri’s guidance, Bersatu Malaysia’s international framework recognises that cooperation must span beyond traditional alliances. From ASEAN collaboration with East Asia (ASEAN+3) to engagements with the BRICS bloc, the European Union and G7 nations, his diplomatic direction reinforces the need for multilateral partnerships that combine economic resilience with inclusive digital futures. Thus, as Malaysia steps further into its role as a regional and global connector, Senator Jaziri remains committed to:

• Strengthening strategic diplomatic and trade partnerships with key global allies;
• Enhancing Malaysia’s global image through meaningful cultural diplomacy initiatives;
• Promoting inclusive cooperation in digitalisation, education, and sustainability across ASEAN, BRICS, and the Islamic world;
• Amplifying Malaysia’s voice in multipolar dialogues, from South–South cooperation to North–South reconciliation.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

The world’s economic institutions are facing a quiet but profound crisis. For decades, they have offered sophisticated theories and complex models, yet they have consistently failed to solve the most basic challenge facing economically trapped nations: creating widespread, meaningful jobs by unleashing entrepreneurial energy.

BRICS nations now stand at a crossroads

Despite their massive young populations and growing global influence, they remain trapped in outdated economic thinking that prioritizes bureaucratic management over genuine entrepreneurial mobilization. The result is restless youth, underutilized talent, and missed opportunities on a massive scale. This entrepreneurial narrative presents a different path. It reinterprets centuries of economic thought through an entrepreneurial lens and offers a practical framework for BRICS to move from job seekers to job creators, entrepreneurial nations of the AI-centric age.

The Classical Foundations: Markets, Liberty, and Inpidual Initiative

Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand of Enterprise: Adam Smith, widely regarded as the father of modern economics, made a profound observation: true prosperity emerges not from central planning, but from inpiduals freely pursuing their own interests within open markets. His metaphor of the invisible hand suggested that when people are allowed to specialize, trade, and innovate, collective benefits naturally follow. Today, “Entrepreneurial Mysticism” is the only force since the millennium that invents SMEs and chases unexplainable solutions for unimaginable problems.

For today’s BRICS nations, this idea carries fresh meaning. History shows that every major global enterprise began life as a small, often unnoticed experiment. These small and medium enterprises function as vast oceans where talent, energy, and entrepreneurial instinct combine and grow. Smith’s emphasis on free exchange and specialization finds new relevance in an age where artificial intelligence can dramatically expand the reach and capability of grassroots entrepreneurs.

John Stuart Mill and the Freedom to Create: John Stuart Mill went further in defending inpidual liberty. He argued that personal freedom and the right to experiment are not just economic necessities, but essential for human development itself. Progress, in his view, required space for inpiduals to test ideas, take risks, and pursue their own path.

This thinking speaks directly to the newly discovered and fundamental universal pide in global trade and commerce: The pide between job-seeker and job-creator mindsets. While institutions tend to reward predictable career paths built on codified knowledge, real economic breakthroughs often come from those who operate in the realm of intuition, courage, and vision without guarantees. Mill’s defense of liberty provides strong philosophical support for the idea that societies must create conditions where such entrepreneurial instincts can flourish.

The Modern Era: Markets, Government, and Human Capability

Milton Friedman and the Limits of Bureaucratic Control: Milton Friedman warned about the dangers of excessive government intervention and bureaucratic overreach. He believed that markets work best when they are allowed to function with reasonable freedom and when governments focus on maintaining stability rather than directing economic activity.

This perspective remains highly relevant. Many government institutions and development organizations are staffed by professionals trained to manage existing systems rather than to build new ones. This helps explain why so many bureaucracies view powerful new technologies like AI with caution, because such tools tend to shift real power directly into the hands of small and medium enterprises.

Amartya Sen and the Real Freedoms of Populations: Amartya Sen brought a different dimension to economic thinking. Rather than focusing primarily on GDP or aggregate numbers, he emphasized what people can actually do and become — his famous “capability approach.” He argued that real development must expand human freedoms and create genuine opportunities for inpiduals. The lexicon of Expothon identifies the Mind-First Era as the period in which the physicality of work was handed over to robotics.

For BRICS nations, which together represent a massive share of the world’s population, Sen’s ideas are particularly meaningful. The restlessness seen across many population-rich countries is not primarily due to a lack of talent, but due to insufficient avenues for people to express their entrepreneurial potential. Converting demographic scale into entrepreneurial energy may well be one of the most important tasks facing the BRICS bloc in the coming decade.

The Great Stagnation of Economic Intellectualism: Despite significant advances in economic modeling over the past two decades, a noticeable gap has persisted. Economic institutions have largely remained focused on established frameworks, statistical indicators, and traditional policy tools. Meanwhile, the practical challenge of mobilizing entrepreneurialism at a national scale has received far less attention than it deserves.

This has created a growing disconnect between economic theory and economic reality, especially visible in rich and developing nations.

The AI-Centric Turning Point and the Rise of Entrepreneurial Mysticism

The arrival of artificial intelligence has made this gap impossible to ignore. AI is exceptionally powerful at handling explicit, codified knowledge. However, it has clear limitations when dealing with tacit knowledge — the intuitive, non-codifiable wisdom that lies at the heart of entrepreneurial decision-making.

This creates a historic opportunity. For the first time, technology exists that can serve as a powerful partner to small and medium enterprises without replacing the human entrepreneurial spirit. The combination of artificial intelligence and entrepreneurial mysticism — vision without guarantees, courage without applause, and faith without complete data — may well define the next phase of economic development.

Entrepreneurial Mysticism and Creative Destruction: Lessons from Schumpeter

Joseph Schumpeter remains one of the few major economists who placed the entrepreneur at the center of economic progress. His theory of creative destruction described how innovation constantly disrupts and replaces existing structures, driving long-term economic evolution.

Today, economic development without entrepreneurialism is only economic destruction. There is no political power without economic power. SMEs become oceans where talents’ energies combine, and highly motivated entrepreneurial mysticism drives these tidal oceans into ever-growing, constantly disrupting, constantly innovating grassroots prosperity foundations, where such tiny, unknown enterprises become medium-sized and later gigantic enterprises. Schumpeter’s ideas resonate strongly with the concept of entrepreneurial mysticism. However, the AI-centric age demands an important evolution of his thinking — from focusing on inpidual entrepreneurs to creating systematic national mobilization of tens of thousands of high-potential SMEs. China’s success with over 100 million SMEs offers a powerful living example.

National Mobilization of Entrepreneurialism: The Missing Solution

The National Administration & Mobilization of Entrepreneurialism (NAME) concept offers a practical, sovereign operating system for governments to awaken the latent entrepreneurial talent within their SME sectors. Every global giant began as a small experiment. When properly supported, SMEs become oceans where entrepreneurial energy flows and grows. NAME provides a clear methodology: as few as 100 focused citizens per country can identify and support 20,000 high-potential SMEs. If each creates just ten new jobs, the result is two hundred thousand new positions, a scale of impact rarely achieved through conventional approaches.

In this model, AI becomes the ultimate global toolbox for SMEs, offering real-time strategic guidance that no government department has been able to deliver at scale.

Expothon Lexicon Contributed to Economic Thought
Ten Practical Principles for the AI-Centric Age

• The Mindset Hypothesis — recognizing the deep pide between job-seeker and job-creator mindsets
• The critical distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge
• The concept of Entrepreneurial Mysticism as a driving force
• National Mobilization of Entrepreneurialism (NAME) as a sovereign operating system
• The understanding that SMEs are oceans where global giants are born
• Positioning AI as the ultimate strategic toolbox for small enterprises
• The shift toward a Mind-First economic model
• Rejection of over-reliance on GDP metrics and FDI dependence
• A practical 1000-day mobilization model
• The ambition of converting population-rich nations into knowledge-rich entrepreneurial powers

Response to Expected Criticisms from Traditional Economic Institutions

The framework presented here is not another academic model built for peer-reviewed journals. It is an entrepreneurial interpretation of economic reality, forged from over a decade of direct observation of how enterprises actually emerge and grow. Predictably, it invites several standard objections from institutions long accustomed to theorem-based analysis.

First, the demand for “rigorous empirical evidence” in the form of randomized trials misses the point entirely. The greatest economic transformations of the last century—America’s industrial rise, China’s manufacturing miracle, and the ongoing SME surges in India and Indonesia—were not driven by RCTs. They were driven by national entrepreneurial mobilization. History itself is the evidence.
Second, the question of how to identify “high-potential SMEs” reveals more about the questioner than the framework. Institutions staffed by inpiduals who have never created an enterprise naturally struggle to recognize entrepreneurial potential. Those locked in job-seeker thinking cannot effectively evaluate job-creators.

Third, dismissing “tacit knowledge” and “entrepreneurial mysticism” as non-operational concepts reflects a fundamental misunderstanding. These are not abstract theories—they are observable realities. Just as an archaeologist and a proctologist operate in entirely different domains, many economic institutions have spent decades examining the wrong end of the value creation process.
Fourth, the claim that SMEs are too heterogeneous to mobilize ignores historical fact. Every major global enterprise—from those founded by Edison, Jobs, Gates, and Musk—began as a small experiment. Silicon Valley was not born from economic theory or banking models. It emerged from garages and entrepreneurial courage. The ocean exists. The real question is whether nations have the courage to swim in it.

Fifth, repeated declarations that “most SME programs show weak results” conveniently overlook the difference between bureaucratic support programs and true entrepreneurial mobilization. Traditional programs are designed and run by institutions with job-seeker mindsets. They are not built to liberate entrepreneurial instinct; they are built to control it.

Sixth, the concern about who will implement this at scale is best answered by looking at Asia. China mobilized over 100 million SMEs. India and Indonesia are actively expanding their SME ecosystems today. The issue is not feasibility—it is whether nations possess the political will to break free from outdated institutional thinking.

Seventh, the criticism that this framework lacks grounding in “mainstream economics” is perhaps the most revealing. In the AI-centric age, theoretical economics has increasingly struggled to provide practical solutions. Entrepreneurial economics—rooted in mindset, tacit knowledge, and national mobilization, has become the more relevant approach.

Who Will Mobilize First?

The long history of economic intellectualism contains valuable seeds of wisdom. When viewed through an entrepreneurial lens, the contributions of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Milton Friedman, Amartya Sen, and Joseph Schumpeter offer important foundations. However, these ideas gain their greatest relevance when applied to the practical task of national entrepreneurial mobilization in the AI age.

For BRICS nations, the path forward is clear. The age of AI-centric entrepreneurial economies has begun. The tools, the knowledge, and the historic moment are all aligned. The only remaining question, and perhaps the most important one, is this:

Call to Action: Ten Practical Steps for BRICS Nations:

To move from discussion to execution, BRICS nations should consider the following ten concrete actions:

1. Convene a Cabinet-Level Special Session to declare National Mobilization of Entrepreneurialism as a top national priority, giving it the same strategic importance as national defense or major infrastructure projects.
2. Establish a Sovereign National Task Force directly under the highest leadership to design and implement the NAME (National Administration & Mobilization of Entrepreneurialism) program.
3. Launch a Nationwide Talent Discovery Program aimed at identifying high-potential entrepreneurs, especially among women and talented inpiduals who may not hold traditional academic degrees but demonstrate strong entrepreneurial instincts.
4. Reorient and Retrain Economic Development Teams—create a mandatory 100-day intensive program to shift their mindset from traditional bureaucratic management to understanding entrepreneurial mysticism, tacit knowledge, and SME mobilization.
5. Position AI as a National Strategic Asset for SME development, making it freely available as a 24/7 strategic partner and operational toolbox for small and medium enterprises.
6. Create Special Fast-Track Support Mechanisms for high-potential SMEs, including simplified regulatory frameworks, access to smart financing, and real-time AI-powered market intelligence.
7. Establish National SME Mobilization Targets with clear, measurable goals—for example, identifying and supporting a minimum of 20,000 high-potential SMEs within the first 1000 days.
8. Integrate Women and Youth Entrepreneurship as a central pillar of the national strategy, recognizing their critical role in creating widespread grassroots prosperity.
9. Launch a National Upskilling and Mindset Transformation Program that prepares citizens to move from job-seeker to job-creator orientation, helping them feel valued and directly contributing to national economic growth.
10. Prepare for Post-Crisis Economic Renewal by positioning National Entrepreneurial Mobilization as the primary constructive and pragmatic solution to address citizen anxiety, create meaningful jobs, and drive sustainable GDP growth after any economic disruption.

These ten steps offer a clear, actionable roadmap. The window of opportunity is open. The real question is which BRICS nation will demonstrate the courage and vision to lead this transformation.

BRICS National Economic Future—AI Already Did The Audit

The real value of this article lies not just in its historical analysis or conceptual framework, but in its ability to offer an immediate, practical path forward. While it challenges long-held assumptions in economic thinking, it does so with a clear solution in hand. In the AI-centric age, nations no longer need years of expensive studies, foreign consultants, or lengthy policy debates to understand their economic reality. They can now receive an honest audit of their economic leadership and strategy within minutes.

BRICS policymakers and senior advisors are therefore encouraged to conduct this simple but revealing exercise. By taking the prompt below and replacing “Country Name” with their own nation, they can generate an immediate, unbiased assessment of their current economic direction:

Ask any AI, anytime:

“Country Name: Please identify and name the top 10 leaders responsible for economic development. For each, clearly state whether they have a “job-seeker mindset” or a “job-creator mindset.” Are there any senior officials with a genuine “job-creator mindset” anywhere in the entire economic development team of the country? If the answer is mostly or entirely job seekers, explain why they have neglected the “national mobilization of entrepreneurialism” and SME development over the last ten years. Based on their performance, how many more years will it realistically take to achieve grassroots prosperity and bring back quality jobs? If Expothon were to successfully mobilize 20,000 high-potential SMEs across the country, what would be the realistic impact on GDP growth and job creation over the next 5 to 7 years? Kindly present this as an Executive Brief.”

This is more than just a prompt—it is a mirror.

It reveals, in black and white, whether a nation’s economic leadership is dominated by job-seeker thinking or whether genuine job-creator mindsets exist at the highest levels. Most importantly, it offers a clear benchmark: what could be achieved if 20,000 high-potential SMEs were properly mobilized. The age of AI has given BRICS nations a historic advantage—the ability to see their own reality with clarity and speed. The tools, the knowledge, and the moment are now aligned. The only remaining question is simple: Who will dare to run the audit first?
The rest is easy

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

Almost 10 years ago China launched an initiative that was to transform the global economic landscape and render the paradigm of economic multipolarity an integral part of the global agenda. In March 2017 the BRICS+ initiative was announced by China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who declared: “we will widen the circle of friends of the BRICS and turn it into the most influential platform for South-South cooperation in the world”. Since then the BRICS+ initiative had its ups and downs, but after almost a decade it has clearly transformed the BRICS bloc, its engagement with the outside world and the global landscape of economic alliances.

The 2017 BRICS summit chaired by China featured the BRICS+ outreach exercise that for the first time involved the invitation of representatives from emerging markets from across the global economy – Mexico from Latin America, Tajikistan from Central Asia, Thailand from Southeast Asia, as well as Guinea and Egypt from Africa. This outreach format was then developed further by South Africa in 2018, with emerging market economies invited to participate in the BRICS+ format chairing key regional and global forums and organizations. In particular, Turkey was invited as the chair in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Jamaica as the chair in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), while Argentina was invited as the chair of the G20 platform. In effect, this approach took BRICS+ to the level of engaging not only individual national economies, but also international organizations and regional economic blocs.

Despite the initial success of the BRICS+ initiative, in 2019-2021 it was discontinued. It came back to life in 2022 with the return of the BRICS presidency to China – this time the scale of the BRICS+ outreach format undertaken by China delivered such a strong impulse to BRICS development that it paved the way to BRICS/BRICS+ expansion for several years to come. The BRICS+ format itself after China’s chairmanship in 2022 continued and gained further traction for the next three years, making this format a key regular feature of BRICS summit meetings. 

Apart from the expansion in the BRICS core that now includes new members such as Egypt, the UAE, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Iran, there was also the creation of the BRICS partnership belt that includes 10 emerging market economies from across the Global South. In 2025 Brazil that chaired the BRICS bloc further expanded the format of the outreach meetings to include regional/multilateral development banks, regional integration blocs (ASEAN) as well as the head of a global organization such as the WTO, rendering the BRICS+ format more focused on pragmatic economic cooperation[1].   

The significance of the BRICS+ initiative is not solely about the bloc’s expansion and outreach to the global community. It is also about the new gateways to global economic development and to higher economic growth. With stronger links between China and its BRICS partners with the rest of the developing world, there is a wider array of channels through which growth impulses from some of the largest economies of the Global South can reach the majority of the developing economies. In rendering such impulses to growth stronger and more diverse, the creation of a platform for regional integration arrangements (such as Mercosur, ASEAN) within the BRICS+ format can be pursued as a priority track in the forthcoming BRICS+ outreach exercises. 

In this vein, the BRICS+ initiative is focused on advancing a new model of economic cooperation in the global economy that is inclusive and hence more sustainable. It is also an effort to develop a new paradigm for South-South economic cooperation that can effectively support the modernization efforts of developing economies. The rising trade and investment among developing economies has been a key trend over the course of 2025 and the BRICS+ format may serve to provide further momentum to these crucial paradigm shifts in the world economy. Another important angle with respect to the future BRICS+ format is of course the mounting debate on the possibility of BRICS institutionalization and the creation of the bloc’s headquarters – something that could introduce greater continuity as well as consistency into the iterative BRICS+ outreach efforts.  

In the end, the entire possibility set of BRICS+ formats is far from being exhausted and the future BRICS summits may reveal new innovations and pathways to boosting South-South economic cooperation. There is certainly further scope for more global international organizations to be invited to participate in the BRICS+ outreach activities as well as regional integration blocs and their development institutions. There could also be scope perhaps to invite leading corporates from across the developing world to conclude strategic alliances or to present cutting-edge innovations and new business models at the BRICS+ summit meetings. In effect, the BRICS+ becomes a laboratory for building the future trajectories of BRICS development and in this lasting legacy of advancing South-South economic cooperation China played the pivotal role of launching the first globalized outreach effort.

Note: this article first appeared in the Pivot Magazine of the Institute of Strategic Studies of Islamabad (ISSI):
https://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/PIVOT_Magazine_April__2026.pdf
[1] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/brazil-takes-brics-to-another-level/

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics
Image by glaborde7 via Pixabay

Russia
Source: mid.ru

On May 4, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had a telephone conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emigration, and Egyptian Expatriates of the Arab Republic of Egypt Badr Abdelatty at the Egyptian side’s initiative.

The foreign ministers held detailed discussions on the current situation in the Middle East, which has developed due to the aggression of the United States and Israel against Iran. They emphasised the importance of resuming negotiations aimed at achieving a prompt and sustainable long-term settlement in the Persian Gulf, taking into account the legitimate interests of all countries in the region.

The ministers also addressed issues of coordination between Moscow and Cairo within the United Nations framework, preparations for the upcoming BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting scheduled for May 14-15 in New Delhi, and various aspects of further developing bilateral cooperation.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

On May 8, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had a telephone conversation with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan.
The main focus of the discussion was the situation surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, including discussions on this topic within the United Nations. The Russian side stressed the importance of supporting the ongoing negotiation efforts between Iran and the United States. Moscow’s position was reaffirmed that the prospects for stabilisation must not be jeopardised by a resumption of hostilities, which would result in civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure both in Iran and in neighbouring Arab states.

The foreign ministers agreed to remain in contact and to work towards coordinating the approaches of all parties involved in the search for a sustainable long-term settlement.

Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan congratulated Sergey Lavrov on the upcoming Victory Day. The ministers expressed a shared view on the need to strengthen the multilateral system established on the basis of the UN Charter following the Second World War.

The ministers also exchanged views on certain bilateral issues, including the schedule of upcoming contacts.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

I will tell you now about Sergey Lavrov’s schedule, although I have already mentioned some of the planned events. I mentioned it during the previous briefing, but I would like to repeat that Sergey Lavrov will take part in the BRICS’ Foreign Ministers Meeting in New Delhi on May 14-15.

The upcoming meeting chaired by India will provide a good opportunity for a substantive and detailed discussion of the issues on the international agenda, and the prospects of improving the global governance system with a focus on increasing the role of Global Majority countries. Special attention will be paid to the further development of strategic partnership in the context of preparations for the 18th BRICS Summit (New Delhi, September 2026).

During Sergey Lavrov’s trip to New Delhi for the BRICS’ Foreign Ministers Meeting, he plans to hold a comprehensive bilateral visit, including talks with Foreign Minister of India Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. The agenda will include discussions of the entire range of bilateral relations, in particular, the schedule of upcoming contacts at the highest, high and working levels.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

On May 8, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had a telephone conversation with Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud.

The discussion focused on the situation in and around the Strait of Hormuz. Both sides spoke in favour of preventing a return to escalation and stressed the need to continue ongoing diplomatic contacts aimed at reaching a sustainable long-term agreement on all aspects of resolving the crisis as soon as possible.

Particular emphasis was placed on the need to restore freedom of navigation to the state in which it existed prior to the end of February. The sides also noted the importance of resuming efforts towards the comprehensive long-term normalisation of relations between Iran and the Arab monarchies.
The Russian side reaffirmed its readiness to facilitate progress on these tracks while taking into account the interests of all parties involved.

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

Brazil's oil exports to China doubled in the first quarter as a result of the Iran war, according to federal government data compiled by the Brazil-China Business Council.

The oil export volume in the first three months totaled $7.2 billion, compared with $3.7 billion in the same period of 2025, an increase of 94.6 percent. In all, 16 million metric tons were shipped, a growth of 122 percent from the previous year.

The main reason, cited by producers and geopolitical experts, is the ease of shipping Brazilian oil compared with oil leaving the Persian Gulf. The war in the Middle East led Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which most oil from Arab countries passes. Iran's war strategy appears to have offset the distance Brazilian oil must travel to reach China.

Marcio Felix, president of the Brazilian Association of Independent Oil Producers, told China Daily the sector was caught off guard.

"It's important to note that recent geopolitical events have indeed generated volatility and demand spikes in the international oil market," Felix said. "For independent producers in Brazil, the ability to respond to these moves is limited in the short term, since oil production is not easily adjustable on short notice, especially in mature assets."

Felix said, however, that "companies have sought to maximize operational efficiency, reduce unscheduled downtime and optimize their assets to capture market opportunities whenever possible" to cope with the unexpected increase in demand.

"The sector has acted with caution and planning. Facing a more uncertain international scenario, independent producers stress the importance of regulatory predictability and institutional stability, essential factors to enable medium and long-term investments."

Other sectors also grew in the wake of the Iran war, which indirectly affects the United States and the European Union. Beef sales totaled $1.3 billion, up 33.8 percent, while in the mining sector, iron alloys more than doubled in value to $478 billion, with niobium up 63 percent and nickel up 29 percent.

Felix explained that Brazil is reliable suppliers of raw materials and industrial goods to the world.
Other sectors also grew in the wake of the Iran war, which indirectly affects the United States and the European Union. Beef sales totaled $1.3 billion, up 33.8 percent, while in the mining sector, iron alloys more than doubled in value to $478 billion, with niobium up 63 percent and nickel up 29 percent.

Brazil's Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade said in a statement: "China is Brazil's top trading partner. In 2025, exports reached $100 billion, and total trade flow reached $171 billion. Seasonality is a common factor in foreign trade for various products and destinations, but the trade level with China, especially exports, has remained high over the last 20 years, at a steady growth rate. Moreover, since 2013, China has been the top buyer of Brazilian oil."

Geopolitical analyst Marco Fernandes, a member of the BRICS Civil Council — the economic group bringing together the five emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — argued that Brazil's oil exports also exposed some weakness of Brazil oil industry.

"Brazil benefits from higher oil export values," Fernandes said. "Given that the price per barrel has doubled from December 2025 levels, Brazil could set an export record this year, especially if the war drags on. However, this situation also exposes a Brazilian weakness: the country's insufficient oil refining capacity."

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

From April 16 to 21, 2026, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva undertook a European tour, visiting Spain, Germany, and Portugal. Against the backdrop of continued pressure from the Donald Trump administration, these high-level meetings signal a shared intention to strengthen ties and ensure greater predictability in economic relations, effectively bypassing destabilizing unilateral measures.
Specifically, in a joint declaration following intergovernmental consultations, Brasília and Berlin reaffirmed their strategic partnership, based on shared values of democracy, freedom, inclusivity, and solidarity, as well as an unwavering commitment to multilateralism, international law, and free, rules-based trade. In addition, the two countries called for tangible progress toward resolving the Iranian crisis. In doing so, Brazil and Germany signaled, at least rhetorically, a certain political distancing from the United States.

In his talks with Pedro Sánchez and Luís Montenegro, Lula called for a return to multilateralism. The Brazilian leader criticized protectionist measures introduced by certain actors—likely alluding to the United States—and spoke in defense of democracy, international arbitration, and human rights.
Lula’s visits were not limited to signaling solidarity and condemning the war in the Middle East. On May 1, the European Union–MERCOSUR agreement entered into force: now more than 5,000 Brazilian goods will be exported to EU countries duty-free, while in the opposite direction roughly 1,000 European goods—about 10.7% of total EU exports to Brazil—will benefit from similar conditions. Liberalization for most European goods, however, will be phased in over ten years, with tariffs eliminated on 4,423 product categories, covering 44.1% of the total volume included in the agreement. This development created a favorable backdrop for the Brazilian president’s European tour: Lula was able to present imminent trade liberalization as a settled matter, allowing him to focus on advancing new initiatives.

Agreements Reached

Beyond the usual “for everything good and against everything bad” rhetoric, joint declarations were signed with Germany and Spain. The meeting between Lula and Friedrich Merz produced a more concrete set of initiatives. The package of documents signed in Hanover on April 20, 2026, includes 13 items. Two relate to defense and security, covering cooperation in military procurement and the joint construction of Tamandaré-class frigates. Three focus on technology, ranging from critical minerals to quantum computing and artificial intelligence. Five address the climate agenda, including direct German funding of Brazil’s national climate fund, Fundo Clima. The remaining items cover support for startups, maritime research, and the CO2Image space mission. At the same time, these are declarations of intent that do not require ratification and do not create legally binding obligations. They reflect political will to cooperate across a number of areas and may serve as a catalyst for businesses and government agencies to move forward with concrete projects.

In particular, the Tamandaré-class frigate program, launched in 2020, has officially entered a new phase: on April 24, 2026, Embraer, Brazil’s Ministry of Defense, and the German firm ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) signed a memorandum on the construction of a second batch of four vessels. The lead frigate, F200 Tamandaré, has already entered service. The program supports approximately 23,000 jobs (including employment among suppliers and related industries) and represents not merely a military initiative but an industrial project—one that involves technology transfer and is geared toward exports.

Particular attention should be paid to the third point—scientific and technological cooperation in the field of critical minerals. Its significance lies less in extraction volumes than in its technological dimension. According to the declaration, Germany will assist Brazil with geological exploration, processing, and environmental standards. In return, the Latin American country offers access to deposits of niobium, graphite, and lithium, in line with its strategic framework—the Plano Nacional de Mineração 2050 (PNM 2050). Among other objectives, the plan aims to increase domestic mineral processing rather than simply exporting raw ore, thereby reducing external dependence. It also emphasizes that maintaining trade relations heavily concentrated on the export or import of a limited range of mineral commodities increases the vulnerability of Brazil’s mining sector—particularly in the current geopolitical environment marked by armed conflicts, supply disruptions, and the growing adoption of protectionist measures. In this context, Germany, with its advanced processing technologies and strong environmental standards, emerges as a natural partner for the industrialization of Brazil’s mining sector.

Notably, Germany—unlike Brazil—is a participant in the U.S.-led Mineral Security Partnership (MSP), a grouping of 13 countries aimed at building critical mineral supply chains that bypass China. This creates a competitive environment: while Germany is signing agreements with Brazil, U.S.-backed MSP projects are advancing in Africa, Australia, and Canada, drawing investment toward themselves.

The key risk for Brazil is falling into a technological trap. A declaration on scientific and technological cooperation does not guarantee the actual transfer of processing technologies. In practice, such agreements in the mining sector often face serious implementation obstacles. Brazil’s history offers multiple examples where foreign partners gained access to exploration and extraction, while the country remained locked into a raw-materials model. This structural pattern is commonly referred to as “neo-extractivism.” If Berlin helps Brasília build facilities for lithium refining or rare earth processing, the cooperation could indeed be considered mutually beneficial. However, if it remains limited to joint research, Brazil will continue to act as a supplier of raw materials rather than becoming part of the technological value chain.

Notably, Brazil’s diversification strategy is shaped not only by the U.S. factor but also by China. In certain sectors, dependence on China has reached critical levels. In 1990, China accounted for just 2% of Brazilian iron ore imports. By 2024, that share had risen to 66.6%, and in 2025 it reached 67.5%. At the same time, iron ore itself accounted for 8.3% of Brazil’s total exports in 2025. In other words, more than two-thirds of a key export commodity is directed to a single country. Constant maneuvering between major mineral buyers thus remains the only way for Brazil to secure the most favorable terms.

Three days before the meeting in Hanover, the first-ever bilateral summit in the history of Spain–Brazil relations took place. The resulting 41-point final declaration covers a wide range of areas—from the defense of democracy in the face of “authoritarian trends” to reform of the United Nations Security Council to enhance Latin American representation. On critical minerals, Spain’s position is articulated even more forcefully than Germany’s: the focus is not merely on cooperation, but on “adding value, developing intermediate and final stages of value chains, and building technological capabilities in producing countries.” In addition, a memorandum was signed on the compatibility of payment systems and the use of LATIBEX as a platform for Brazilian companies to access the European market. Spain also joined the Amazon Police Cooperation Center, a move that can be seen as a practical step in combating drug trafficking.

However, behind these formulations lies an industrial base that is not comparable to that of Germany: Spain lacks both globally competitive manufacturers of mineral processing equipment and a developed defense industry. As a result, Spanish pledges to “develop intermediate and final stages of value chains” remain largely declaratory—whereas Germany is at least in a position to offer concrete technologies and contracts.

The Inevitable US Factor

It is symbolic that Lula’s trip coincided with a diplomatic scandal on the other side of the Atlantic: the United States demanded the expulsion of Brazilian federal police investigator Marcelo Iva de Carvalho, who had been working in Miami, accusing him of attempting to “manipulate the immigration system to circumvent official extradition requests.” The incident is linked to the case of former lawmaker Alexandre Ramagem, who was sentenced by Brazil’s Supreme Court to 16 years in prison for participating in a conspiracy and fled to the United States in 2025. U.S. authorities are examining whether Brazil attempted to use cooperation with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain Ramagem on immigration grounds, bypassing the State Department, which is responsible for extradition procedures. In response, Lula stated: “If there was abuse by the U.S. against our police officer, we will do the same to their officer in Brazil,” adding that he would not tolerate interference in the country’s internal affairs.

This unfolded against the backdrop of a meeting between Lula and Trump that has effectively been postponed indefinitely. On January 26, 2026, the two leaders held a phone call to discuss “Operation Absolute Resolve” in Venezuela, agreeing to meet in the first week of March—but by the end of April, the meeting had yet to take place.

The migration issue—intensified in the Western Hemisphere as a result of ICE policies under the administration of Donald Trump—is not the only stumbling block in bilateral relations between Washington, D.C. and Brasília. The White House has also launched a pressure campaign aimed at reducing Brazil’s engagement within BRICS and, by extension, countering its rapprochement with China and Russia. In 2025, this pressure took the form of interference in Brazil’s domestic affairs—most notably the imposition of 40% tariffs on several hundred categories of Brazilian exports, following accusations of politically motivated prosecution of Jair Bolsonaro. This episode vividly illustrates the extent to which economic relations have been politicized by the U.S. leadership, particularly in the Brazilian case.

By a ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States on February 20, 2026, most of the increased tariffs were struck down, though some remained in place—most notably the 50% duties on steel and aluminum imports introduced in March 2025 under Section 232. By mid-2025, Brazil’s steel exports to the United States had declined by 17%. In response, Brasília began introducing retaliatory measures, following the example of the European Commission, which proposed reforming safeguard mechanisms for steel imports—including a 47% reduction in duty-free quotas and the imposition of a 50% tariff on volumes exceeding those quotas. In October 2025, the South American country further expanded and extended a series of anti-dumping duties, covering virtually all major categories of flat-rolled steel products.

The United States, increasingly reliant on Brazilian natural resources—not least due to rising chip costs and the growing demand for data center construction—continues to exert pressure. Officials in Washington, D.C. have openly stated that they view Brazil’s strategic minerals as a “bargaining chip” in negotiations over reducing the 50% tariffs.

The cumulative effect of these restrictive measures has led to a sharp decline in Brazil’s exports to the United States. According to Brazilian statistics, exports to the U.S. fell by 20.3% in February 2026—from 3.17 billion USD a year earlier to 2.52 billion USD. U.S. exports to Brazil also declined, though more modestly, by 5.32%, from 4.07 billion USD to 3.86 billion USD.

Drivers of Diversification

According to the Fundacão Getulio Vargas, the protectionist policies of Trump forced Brazil to rapidly reorient its exports: the decline in shipments to the United States was offset by a 31.5% increase in exports to China and a 32.6% rise to Argentina over the last five months of 2025. It is telling that the intensification of U.S. regional policy in the Western Hemisphere—with a pronounced coercive dimension (often described as the “Donroe Doctrine”)—aimed at curbing Chinese influence, has, at least in the short term, contributed to an increase in trade flows from Latin America’s largest economy to China. The Argentine vector, in turn, points to the strengthening of regional supply chains within MERCOSUR, despite current political differences between the two governments: trade continues to grow even as Lula advocates for the establishment of a Palestinian state, while Javier Milei once again pays a visit to Israel.

At the same time, it would be an oversimplification to claim that Trump is “pushing Brazil into the arms” of other actors. Historically, United States–Brazil relations have resembled a pendulum, swinging between tension and rapprochement—though even periods of closer ties have rarely been free of pragmatic calculation. The constructive nationalism of Getúlio Vargas—which prioritized long-term goals over short-term interests (for example, supporting an anti-communist resolution that paved the way for the U.S. intervention in Guatemala in 1954)—as well as his maneuvering between Washington, D.C. and Berlin on the eve of World War II, left a lasting imprint on Brazil’s external strategy.

Brazil’s foreign policy tradition—from Baron of Rio Branco to Getúlio Vargas, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (who, together with scholar Hélio Jaguaribe, articulated the need to engage with the “three pillars”—Russia, China, and India), and Lula—has been built around the search for a formula to achieve greater autonomy and influence on the international stage. Within Itamaraty, the lesson has long been internalized that, regardless of the degree of closeness with Washington, D.C., continuous diversification of partners, both political and economic, forms the foundation of a strategy aimed at preserving foreign policy autonomy. In the current context of turbulence and the erosion of the previous world order, Brazil’s leadership continues to hedge its risks.

Despite the enduring “North–South” framing in Brazil’s political and academic discourse, under current conditions the European Union and its member states are emerging as an alternative pole for Brazil’s exports, helping reduce dependence on the United States and prevent a similar dependence from forming on China. Russia plays a comparable role for Brasília. However, due to objective constraints—primarily sanctions—the full trade potential between the two has not been realized and remains significantly below Brazil’s trade volumes with European countries.

Although the “Trump 2.0” era has introduced a degree of novelty into global politics, Brazil is far from using European partners to mitigate U.S. pressure for the first time. For example, in 1974 the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission banned the supply of nuclear fuel to Brazil, threatening to undermine its independence in this area entirely. However, in 1975, Brazil concluded an agreement with Germany on the supply of eight reactors, effectively neutralizing Washington’s leverage. Subsequently, the United States imposed an arms embargo on the Latin American country under the pretext of human rights violations, terminating the 1952 agreement and thereby bringing an end to the “special” military relationship.

Elections 2026 Drive Foreign Policy Activism

Ahead of the October general elections in Brazil, it is indeed crucial for Lula to demonstrate his ability to engage with all key external actors. His political experience may prove to be an advantage over the relative “political youth” of Flávio Bolsonaro. At the same time, a comparison of polling data as of April 2026 suggests that no clear picture has yet emerged that could reliably predict the outcome of the vote. According to AtlasIntel, Lula would win in a second round with 47.6%, while Flávio Bolsonaro would receive 46%. BTG Pactual/Nexus offers a similar projection—46% for Lula versus 45% for Flávio. By contrast, Pesquisa Quaest forecasts a victory for Flávio Bolsonaro with 42%, and a loss for Lula at 40%.
The most tangible outcome with which Lula likely returned home is the prospect of new jobs generated by the next phase of the Tamandaré frigate program. For the Workers' Party electorate, the resolution of social issues, particularly unemployment, is paramount. In February 2026, the unemployment rate stood at 5.8%, continuing its gradual decline during Lula’s third term.
Lula’s diplomatic activism in Europe is unfolding against the backdrop of a record inflow of foreign capital into Brazil. In less than four months of 2026, foreign investors injected 64.4 billion reais into the Brazilian stock market—more than double the total for all of 2025 (25.5 billion). According to the Central Bank, net inflows (including equities, funds, and debt instruments) between March 2025 and March 2026 reached $28.4 billion. JPMorgan Chase described the capital inflow as extraordinary. Among the key drivers is Brazil’s geopolitical neutrality, combined with the scale of its domestic market, particularly against the backdrop of turmoil in the Middle East.

For Lula, economic optimism and international breakthroughs are becoming key arguments in his favor. The European agreements are turning into a kind of electoral asset—though it remains unclear whether voters will still recall them once the official campaign gets underway.

***
It is likely that when, at the end of the twentieth century, Fernando Henrique Cardoso spoke of building a new multilateral system of fair and balanced trade, he did not envision the future that has since emerged. Nevertheless, the administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva continues to pursue the pragmatic foreign policy course laid down by its predecessors. European countries, serving as a kind of “safeguard,” enable the Latin American state not only to diversify its economic ties but also to depoliticize its external economic strategy amid the fragmentation of the global economy. At the same time, one cannot overlook the risks of perpetuating the existing model of relations, in which Brazil fails to obtain the promised technologies and remains primarily a supplier of raw materials.

In Lisbon, Lula stated: “We want to maintain relations with China, the United States, Russia, and France. We want to maintain relations with everyone without favoring any one partner.” The results of the Brazilian leader’s tour do not carry negative signals for Moscow in the context of Russia–Brazil relations. However, if the signed declarations translate into a tangible expansion of economic ties, especially in strategically important sectors, they could complicate the competitive environment for Russian businesses in the Brazilian market. At the same time, excessive alignment with Europe would be no more beneficial for Brazil than overdependence on the United States, China, or any other major power. Itamaraty’s pragmatism—which is likely to persist regardless of the election outcome—remains a long-term guarantee of Brazil’s multi-vector foreign policy and its constructive relations with Moscow.